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In the corporate governance ﬁeld, relations among directors are one kind of social network that cannot be
ignored (Conyon and Muldoon, 2006; Engelberg et al., 2012; Fracassi and Tate, 2012). The behavior of direc-
tors depends simply not only on their own contacts, but also on the inﬂuence of other people’s contacts within
social networks (Granovetter, 1985). Independent directors not only play a role in monitoring the company,
but also play many other social roles, such as serving as company executives, industry association leaders, gov-
ernment oﬃcials, university professors and members of a variety of associations. Directors with many social
roles naturally have a variety of social network connections, such as through their membership of professional
associations, alumni networks and clubs, fellowships, in-law relationships and kinship networks. This paper
focuses on one of the unique forms of social networks – interconnections forged among directors of listed
companies by serving on at least one common board at the same time – to investigate the governance role
of independent directors in China.1
Speciﬁcally, this paper examines the role of independent director board networks in mitigating agency
problems between large shareholders and minority shareholders. That is, whether the network centrality of
independent directors pushes them to deter tunneling by controlling shareholders. In comparison with the
U.S. and a few countries with characteristics of dispersed ownership, most countries have more concentrated
equity ownership (La Porta et al., 1999), and most ﬁrms are controlled by one or a few large shareholders. The
existence of controlling shareholders gives prominence to agency problems with minority shareholders and
tunneling2 is the most direct form of evidence of controlling shareholders’ agency problems that seriously
damage the interests of minority shareholders.3 The tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders in China’s
capital market hinders its healthy development (Chen and Wang, 2005; Jiang et al., 2010). A series of policies
have been issued to restrain tunneling behavior by controlling shareholders. However, these policies have not
achieved their goals in practice (see Section 3 for more details). Many tunneling events have occurred in Chi-
na’s capital market to date. Moreover, these events are becoming increasingly serious.4
This paper does not examine all types of network relations among directors and is limited to an investiga-
tion of the network centrality and governance role of independent directors. There are three reasons for this
approach: ﬁrst, the weak tie and structural hole theories hold that independent directors play the key role in
board networks, whereas most inside directors are isolated and their network characteristics are not obvious.
Second, most inside directors are also executives, which reduces their monitoring role (Fama and Jensen,
1983). This is especially in China, where the chairman of the board plays a role somewhat similar to that
of the CEO in the U.S. (Firth et al., 2007; Ye et al., 2011). Third, due to the mandatory policies on indepen-
dent directors implemented in China’s capital market from 2003 to date, many prior studies ﬁnd that the aver-
age proportion of independent directors is one third, just meeting the CSRC requirement, and that they have
no obvious governance role in China. Hence, given this institutional background, this paper only investigates
independent director networks and their economic consequences.
Among the various mechanisms designed to prevent controlling shareholders from tunneling in China, gov-
ernance by independent directors has been one of the key measures since it was introduced for A-shares in
1 For example, I1, I2 and I3 are three independent directors. I1 and I2 do not serve on the same board, so there is no direct connection
between them; however, when I1 and I3 both serve on the board of Company B, and I2 and I3 both serve on the board of Company C,
then I1 and I2 are indirectly connected by I3.
2 The word “tunneling” was proposed by Johnson et al. (2000) to describe the behavior of company controllers transferring the
company’s assets and proﬁts to further their own interests.
3 Under certain circumstances, controlling shareholders prop up listed companies. For example, Jian and Wong (2010) ﬁnd that
controlling shareholders prop up listed companies through abnormal related party transactions to reach reﬁnancing standards or avoid
delisting. However, they also point out that such propping behavior is accompanied by controlling shareholders transferring listed
company funds in the next period.
4 Based on CSRC data on penalties imposed on controlling shareholders for using listed company funds from 2007 to the end of 2010,
we ﬁnd that such penalties were imposed in relation to 30 listed companies (involving 80 year-observations). During this period, the
number of penalty observations for the use of company funds by large shareholders was still 38 in years after 2007, accounting for 23% of
all such observations between 2000 and 2010.
2001. Independent directors of companies listed on the Chinese capital market have special powers in the
supervision of “signiﬁcant related party transactions and related ﬁnancial problems,” one of six regulatory
requirements. Thus, independent directors must monitor and issue independent opinions on signiﬁcant related
party transactions and the use of related funds. While no clear conclusion can be drawn from existing empir-
ical evidence on the governance role of independent directors (Gao et al., 2006; Ye et al., 2007), this paper
adopts a board network perspective to provide detailed new evidence on the role of independent directors
in curbing tunneling behavior by controlling shareholders. Using various measures for the use of controlling
shareholders’ funds, the empirical results show that the higher the degree of network centrality among inde-
pendent directors, the smaller the extent to which controlling shareholders use shareholders’ funds, especially
when the use of non-operating funds is used as the tunneling measure. These empirical results imply that the
network centrality of independent directors promotes their governance role in deterring tunneling by control-
ling shareholders. In other words, board networks can contribute to the governance practices of independent
directors and reduce Type II agency problems (problems between large shareholders and minority sharehold-
ers). This paper diﬀers from studies focusing on the role of director networks in the United States. For exam-
ple, Hwang and Kim (2009) ﬁnd that independent directors who have social networks with the ﬁrm lose their
independence. Fracassi and Tate (2012) ﬁnd that internally prompted earnings restatements and value-
decreasing M&A activities occur in ﬁrms with more extensive relations among their directors.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Following a review of the literature in Sections 2 and 3
analyzes the institutional background and develops our hypothesis. Section 4 describes the research design.
Section 5 provides the empirical analysis and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Literature review
As the ﬁrst researchers to use the word “tunneling” to describe the misuse of company funds by controlling
shareholders, Johnson et al. (2000) list several methods by which it is achieved: transferring growth opportu-
nities belonging to listed company to themselves or their subsidiaries; transferring proﬁts via intra-group
transactions from listed companies to other subsidiaries they own or control; using assets or capital belonging
to the listed company or using them as collateral or guarantees for their ﬁnancing activities; and capital oper-
ations aimed at diluting the interests of other shareholders. Friedman et al. (2003) propose a model showing
how large shareholders tunnel or prop listed companies in diﬀerent ﬁnancial positions. Meanwhile, companies
with a pyramid ownership structure are more likely to be tunneled, but are more likely to be propped when
facing adverse shocks.
In the Chinese capital market, Yu and Xia (2004) ﬁnd that related party transactions are signiﬁcantly more
prevalent in companies with controlling shareholders. Li et al. (2004) ﬁnds that the use of listed company funds
by controlling shareholders exhibits an inverted U-shaped nonlinear relationship with the proportion of equity
held by the largest shareholders. Wang and Xiao (2005) ﬁnd that the use of funds by the 10 largest shareholders
for related party transactions is signiﬁcantly less common in listed companies with institutional investors and
that an increase in the stake held by institutional investors is signiﬁcantly negatively related to the extent of
funds used by related parties in listed companies. Chen and Wang (2005) ﬁnd that the value of related party
transactions is signiﬁcantly positively related to ownership concentration and that increasing the number of
controlling shareholders holding more than 10% reduces both the probability of related party transactions
occurring and the value of such transactions. Jiang and Yue (2005) ﬁnd a negative relationship between the
use of funds by large shareholders and future proﬁtability in listed companies, and show that the use of funds
by large shareholders has a negative eﬀect on the company. Gao et al. (2006) conclude that tunneling by con-
trolling shareholders is exacerbated by ownership concentration and business group control, but is inhibited by
managerial ownership and fund holdings, information disclosure transparency, investor protection and prod-
uct market competition. Luo and Tang (2007) observe that the less the regional government intervenes in the
market and the more developed are ﬁnancial markets, the lower the probability of tunneling by controlling
shareholders in listed companies in the region. Ju and Pan (2010) ﬁnd that listed ﬁrms that are smaller, have
higher leverage or lower operating margins, or in which non-operating proﬁt accounts for a larger proportion
of total proﬁt are more likely to engage in related party transactions. Du et al. (2010) ﬁnd that high-quality
auditing can signiﬁcantly inhibit the use of company funds by large shareholders of listed companies, but that
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companies with more serious cases of funds being used by large shareholders may not choose to have high-qual-
ity audits performed. Jiang et al. (2010) examine other receivables in Chinese listed companies to examine the
nature, content and economic consequences of controlling shareholder behavior. Jian and Wong (2010) point
out that abnormal related sales are one means of propping used by the controlling shareholders of listed com-
panies, and that it is more prevalent in state-owned listed companies and regions with a poor institutional envi-
ronment. They also show that abnormal related party transactions take place in conjunction with the next
phase of associated lending for cash transfers among controlling shareholders. Using Chinese data to verify
the model of Friedman et al. (2003), Peng et al. (2010) ﬁnd that in ﬁnancially healthy (ﬁnancially distressed)
listed ﬁrms, controlling shareholders are more likely to tunnel (prop) the ﬁrm through related party transac-
tions, and that the market reacts negatively (positively) to such transactions. They also ﬁnd that all types of
related party transactions can be used as a means of tunneling or propping. Wang and Xiao (2011) investigate
the relationship between the tunneling behavior of listed company controlling shareholders and executive com-
pensation incentives in China, and ﬁnd that tunneling by controlling shareholders reduces executives’ pay-for-
performance sensitivity. This implies that controlling shareholders lower the incentives in the relationship
between managerial pay and performance for their own interests.
Prior studies have examined the relationship between the supervision of independent directors and related
party transactions or company fund use by listed company controlling shareholders. Among these studies,
Tang et al. (2005) ﬁnd that independent directors play a governance role in suppressing channel excavation
by large shareholders through related party transactions, such as the use of company funds, asset sales and
security and cash dividends, but that these eﬀects are not obvious. In contrast, Gao et al. (2006) ﬁnd that inde-
pendent directors have no monitoring eﬀect on tunneling behavior by controlling shareholders. After control-
ling for the endogeneity of independent directors, Ye et al. (2007) ﬁnd that increasing the number and
proportion of independent directors may deter controlling shareholders from using company funds. Huang
and Pan (2010) ﬁnd that the professionalism of independent directors has a signiﬁcant monitoring eﬀect on
related party transactions between controlling shareholders and listed companies. They also demonstrate that
independent director compensation is signiﬁcantly positively related to the frequency of related party transac-
tions between controlling shareholders and listed companies, but that the proportion of independent directors
has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on such transactions.
Although the literature has yet to explore the relationship between social networking among corporate
boards and the tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders, some recent studies examine the nexus between
board social networks and corporate ﬁnance. Hochberg et al. (2007) ﬁnd that venture capital companies with
more network relationships perform better in the follow-up ﬁnancing and exit stages. Kuhnen (2009) shows
that mutual fund directors and fund administration consulting ﬁrms prioritize appointing each other based
on the degree of contact they have had in the past, but that such strong director-consultant links do not lead
to better or worse consequences. Based on a sample of 29,637 ﬁrm observations in the United States from 2000
to 2007, Larcker et al. (2013) ﬁnd that ﬁrms with more central director positions earn higher stock returns.
They measure centrality by the number of directors common to two companies. If a portfolio is constructed
by buying stocks of ﬁrms with a central position in a board network and selling stocks of those without, an
average annual excess return of 4.68% can be obtained. Their results show that the board of director network
is a signal of economic beneﬁts not immediately reﬂected in stock prices. In the Chinese capital market, Chen
and Xie (2011, 2012) investigate the relationship between the board network of independent directors of listed
companies and investment eﬃciency or executive incentives.
In sum, ﬁndings on the eﬀect of independent director governance on the tunneling behavior of controlling
shareholders are not conclusive. This paper provides further empirical evidence on this question from the
board network perspective.
3. Background and hypothesis development
3.1. Independent directors and tunneling by controlling shareholders
In ﬁrms with concentrated ownership, controlling shareholders can rely on their controlling capacity to
gain private beneﬁts via various types of transactions with the ﬁrm (e.g., selling assets, commodities or services
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to the ﬁrm at a high price or acquiring assets at a low price). This can occur more frequently in countries with
an ineﬃcient legal environment and weak corporate governance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In the emerging
and transitional market of China, most ﬁrms are controlled by large shareholders. The concentration of own-
ership among Chinese ﬁrms means that Type II agency problems (between controlling and minority share-
holders) are more prevalent and tunneling is one of the most direct ways in which controlling shareholders
misuse company assets at the expense of minority shareholders. Controlling shareholders use various methods
to tunnel listed ﬁrms, such as related party transactions and the use of company funds, the latter of which is
the most visible and serious means of tunneling in the Chinese capital market (Jiang et al., 2010; Wang and
Xiao, 2011).
Because the primary objective of the Chinese capital market is to broaden the ﬁnancing channels of
SOEs, most of the listed companies are SOEs controlled by the government and its aﬃliated bodies.
The non-tradable shares problem these shareholders face further strengthens their tunneling motivation
(Jiang and Yue, 2005).5 Moreover, weak investor protection and penalties for violations provide additional
impetus for tunneling behavior. From 2003 to 2006, regulators implemented penalties for tunneling behav-
ior by controlling shareholders. For example, on August 28, 2003, the CSRC and the State-Owned Assets
Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) jointly announced the “nor-
malization of external guarantees between listed companies and related parties,” and speciﬁed the method
by which tunneling would be prevented among related shareholders. On July 27, 2004, the CSRC and the
SASAC issued a policy relating to debt-equity swaps involving controlling shareholders to use this method
to solve the tunneling problem. In June 2005, the CSRC required listed companies to resolve their cash
occupation problems by the end of the year. On November 7, 2006, eight councils of the Chinese govern-
ment jointly issued the “announcement on cleaning up the use of listed company cash by controlling share-
holders,” and also required that a continuing policy be established. Though regulators have issued various
policies to prohibit tunneling behavior, the governance eﬀect of these measures is not clear. An interesting
phenomenon is that while the CSRC has penalized many ﬁrms, ﬁrms’ controlling shareholders act in their
own way through more implicit methods. From 2007 to 2010, 38 ﬁrms were sanctioned for the illegal use
of cash. Tunneling by controlling shareholders remains a major problem in the Chinese capital market
(Jiang et al., 2010).
Among various corporate government mechanisms, the independent director policy is aimed at monitoring
controlling shareholders and protecting investors’ interests. On August 16, 2001, the CSRC issued the
“announcement on implementing the independent director policy in listed companies” and endowed indepen-
dent directors with six special powers, the ﬁrst one being that major related party transactions must be
approved by independent directors before being submitted to the board for discussion. In addition, indepen-
dent directors were required to express their own views on whether loans or cash transferred to listed compa-
nies’ shareholders, ultimate controllers and related parties amount to more than 5% of total assets. On August
28, 2003, the announcement on the normalization of external guarantees between listed companies and related
parties required independent directors to express their own views on the ﬁrm’s guarantees. All of the foregoing
policies provide independent directors with more powers to prevent tunneling behavior by controlling share-
holders in China. The 2004 Annual Report of the Shanghai Stock Exchange shows that nearly 80% of inde-
pendent directors considered their role were limited to related party transactions and the use of company
funds.6 However, evidence on their success in fulﬁlling this role is mixed. Gao et al. (2006) and Huang and
Pan (2010) ﬁnd that independent directors have no eﬀect on tunneling behavior by controlling shareholders,
whereas Tang et al. (2005) and Ye et al. (2007) ﬁnd that they have a positive eﬀect. As the proportion of inde-
pendent directors in most ﬁrms is about 33%, which just meets the CSRC requirement, their monitoring role
could not be distinguished because of the small degree of variance in the data. Thus, research on the network
characteristics of independent directors is more important in China.
5 Xu (2009) ﬁnds that although the non-tradable share reform has reduced this problem, Type II agency problems haven’t been entirely
resolved.
6 For details, see the 2004 Corporate Governance Report on Chinese Companies: Independence and Eﬃciency of Board Directors,
Research Centre of Shanghai Stock Exchange, Fudan University Press.
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3.2. Board networks, governance role of independent directors and tunneling
We follow Xie and Chen (2012) by deﬁning a board network as directors’ connection sets based on direct
ties established when serving on at least one common board. From the sociology perspective, network rela-
tionships can be expressed as a structure comprising nodes and connections. Thus, in a board network, the
nodes can be seen as the directors and the connections can be seen as the relationships among the directors.
If two directors serve on at least one common board, they are jointly related and directly connected. The set of
direct and indirect connections forms a board network (Larcker et al., 2013). Based on this deﬁnition of a net-
work and on the measurable characteristics of networks, their nature and network data, we deﬁne a board
network as the relationships among board members, which is diﬀerent from other social relations such as
school ties, club relations and kinship. We consider that this type of network is more suitable for empirical
study than others, because weak tie theory and structural hole theory in the social network ﬁeld imply that
independent directors, rather than inside directors, play the key role in board networks. Thus, we focus on
networks among independent directors in this paper.
Fig. 1 illustrates the board network of three listed ﬁrms (Xie and Chen, 2012). The ﬁgure shows that inde-
pendent director O1 will certainly be inﬂuenced by his own attributes when making corporate governance
decisions. For example, as an accounting professor, he will be an expert in the ﬁnancial disclosure ﬁeld. Mean-
while, because independent director O2 has the same background as O1, they may have the same corporate
governance eﬀect according to prior research (assuming their other attributes are the same). Independent
director I11 in ﬁrm A has a legal background, and inside director I33 in ﬁrm C is an industry expert (we
assume that ﬁrms B and C are in the same industry). Therefore, O1 can gain information and professional
knowledge about the law and the industry when communicating with I11 and I33 respectively. However,
O2 cannot obtain similar information and knowledge because he serves on the board of ﬁrm B. Hence, in ﬁrm
B, O1 has a more signiﬁcant eﬀect on corporate governance than O2 because of the embeddedness of the
board network. This is the logic of board networks.
We consider that the governance role of directors can be inﬂuenced by their board network and that the
embeddedness of networks can mediate both over-socialization and under-socialization (Granovetter,
1985). On the one hand, network embeddedness can maintain individual directors’ independence and help
them make decisions based on their professional background and preferences. On the other hand, the net-
work view shows that directors’ governance and decision behavior can evolve into a dynamic and interac-
tive process. Directors in a network can exchange information and obtain speciﬁc knowledge from each
other to improve the eﬃciency of governance. Therefore, director behavior is embedded in their social
networks.
People’s positions in the social structure and social connections can inﬂuence their ability to gain informa-
tion and resources, which in turn inﬂuences their economic actions (Luo, 2010). The network centrality of
independent directors means that they play an active and important role in the overall board network, through
which they can gain more information and broaden their knowledge. Diﬀerences in network positions can
inﬂuence independent directors’ reputational incentives and ability to exercise independence. First, the net-
work positions of directors are an important channel by which they can build a reputation (Freeman,
1979). Sitting in the middle of the entire board network, independent directors can obtain more governance
information and knowledge, strengthen their inﬂuence on the board, and gradually accumulate a reputation
for corporate governance, and may eventually be more likely to secure additional board seats.7 All of these
can be described as the expert reputation the board network provides.8 Second, Lin (2002) considers that net-
work-based prestige has a “symbolic eﬀect”; even if actors cannot gain the resources embedded in the social
7 Cashman et al. (2010) ﬁnd that if board network centrality increases, the probability of securing additional board seats in the future is
greater.
8 Although Fich and Shivdasani (2006) and Andres and Lehman (2010) ﬁnd that interlocking relationships among directors may reduce
their corporate governance eﬀect, Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) demonstrate that the external market for directors is the
channel by which independent directors build their reputation (we refer to this as the reputation capital perspective). In addition, more
academic evidence shows that interlocking directorships can increase the corporate governance eﬀect. Many studies use the number of
seats a director has as an indicator of their reputation in the external labor market (Tan et al., 2010; Ye et al., 2011).
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network, they can be seen as having these resources, which other people view as a symbol. Hence, the more
central the independent director’s network position, the more prestige he gains. Third, if an independent direc-
tor’s position is central, a virtual group can be formed around him, and most members of this group are elite
members of society, which is called an elite circle (Davis et al., 2003; Nguyen, 2009). Wang (2007) ﬁnds that
there is mutual recognition among members of the elite group.9 The greater the network centrality of indepen-
dent directors, the more attention they will pay to others’ recognition and the more time they will spend mak-
ing corporate governance decisions. In contrast, if directors with central positions in the network cannot
prevent tunneling behavior, the “outrage cost” from media and the public could be extremely large and their
reputation within the network will be damaged, a possibility that independent directors should take seriously.
In sum, the expert reputation, social prestige and recognition of the elite group can make independent direc-
tors who attain a central position in the network more sensitive to their reputation, and can give them more of
an incentive and greater pressure to make decisions to prevent tunneling behavior by controlling shareholders.
Moreover, as independent directors with a more central position do not worry about their future board
seats (Cashman et al., 2010), they have greater bargaining power with controlling shareholders, and have more
opportunities to make independent decisions to restrict the tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders,
such as related party transactions or the use of company funds. Furthermore, public pressure may force con-
trolling shareholders to change their tunneling methods in a more implicit way. Because the ability of directors
to collect information can be diﬀerentiated by the diﬀerent network positions they occupy, independent direc-
tors in a central network position can gain more speciﬁc knowledge of how to detect implicit tunneling behav-
ior than those in non-central positions. Hence, the “learning eﬀect” indicates that independent directors with
more central positions are more likely to become aware of and prevent tunneling by controlling shareholders.
We thus hypothesize as follows:
Where the network centrality of independent directors in the ﬁrm is greater, tunneling by controlling share-
holders is less likely to occur and is likely to be less prevalent.
4. Research design
4.1. Measurement of board network centrality
In sociology, network centrality is used to measure diﬀerent degrees of involvement in a social network
(Freeman, 1979; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). We follow the sociology literature by using network centrality
Figure 1. Sample board network.
9 Zhou (2010) ﬁnds that in China, relationships between people have changed from those based on traditional relation-based trust
represented by “diﬀerential patterns” to those characterized by relation-based recognition as represented by “colleagues, friends and
‘friends of friends’”.
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as a measure representing independent directors’ network positions and connections in the whole board net-
work.10 There are four basic network centrality measures: degree centrality, betweenness centrality, closeness
centrality and eigenvector centrality (see Appendix A for more details). Wasserman and Faust (1994) point
out that as each speciﬁc centrality measure has its own advantages and disadvantages, researchers should
not use only one measure and ignore the others. For the degree of network centrality, if a director’s degree
of centrality is small, his position isolates him from other directors in the board network and weakens his par-
ticipation in ongoing communication. Betweenness centrality gauges the ability of a director to gain informa-
tion from the network with initiative, speed and accuracy. Closeness centrality represents how independently
and accurately a director obtains information. That is, if the director does not occupy a central position in the
network, then he must rely on others to obtain information, which reduces its timeliness and accuracy. Eigen-
vector centrality, a recursive measure of degree centrality, represents the quality of connections. In sum, degree
centrality focuses on participation in communication, betweenness centrality on control and initiative in com-
munication, closeness centrality on independence and eﬀectiveness of communication, and eigenvector central-
ity on quality of communication. We draw on these concepts to construct a new and more comprehensive
integrated measure of network centrality (Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Larcker et al., 2013).
Speciﬁcally, we collect information on all directors of A-share listed ﬁrms and arrange them in matrix form.
We ﬁrst calculate the four network centrality measures for each director for completeness of measurement,
then focus exclusively on independent director networks. To construct a ﬁrm-level network measure, we com-
pute the median and mean values of the network centrality of a ﬁrm’s independent directors to estimate the
ﬁrm’s network centrality. In robustness tests, we also use the maximum and minimum values (Schonlau and
Singh, 2009; Larcker et al., 2013). We have two reasons for doing so: ﬁrst, the median value represents the
typical centrality of the independent directors’ network; and second, one independent director’s inﬂuence is
more representative than that of others. In line with Larcker et al. (2013), to reduce the inﬂuence of diﬀerent
dimensions and outliers, we rank the network centrality measures in 10 groups (labeled 0–9) for every year,
then take the mean value as the measure of the ﬁrm’s network centrality (score_median, score_max).
4.2. Measurement of tunneling by controlling shareholders
We use the amount of funds used by controlling shareholders for related party transactions as a proxy for
tunneling behavior. Controlling shareholders make two types of loans to listed companies. Operating loans
generated by normal related party transactions such as accounts receivable and other receivables beyond nor-
mal transactions, such as the use of non-operating funds. The latter type is the key supervisory target of CSRC
regulations (Ye et al., 2007; Zeng and Chen, 2009). Thus, we use other receivables held by the largest share-
holder and its aﬃliated ﬁrms as a proxy for tunneling behavior (TUN). Peng et al. (2010) ﬁnd that controlling
shareholders use all types of related party transactions for tunneling, two of which are used in this paper: the
use of operating funds (ABNTUN) and the use of non-operating funds (NMTUN). However, the use of non-
operating funds by controlling shareholders is adopted as the main measure in this paper. Gao et al. (2006)
and Zeng and Chen (2009) ﬁnd that listed ﬁrms also use funds from their controlling shareholders. Hence,
we also use the net use of funds in robustness tests (DTUN, DABNTUN, DNMTUN). The speciﬁc deﬁnitions
of the variables are listed in Table 1.
4.3. Model and variables
The model used to test the relationship between the network centrality of independent directors and tun-
neling by controlling shareholders is as follows:
Tunnelt ¼ a0 þ a1CENt þ
X
Controlsþ
X
INDþ
X
Year þ e ð1Þ
10 Hochberg et al. (2007), Crespi and Fuster (2009), Barnea and Guedj (2009), Horton et al. (2009), Schonlau and Singh (2009), Farina
(2009), Andres and Lehman (2010), Chuluun et al. (2010), Cashman et al. (2010), Liu (2010) and Larcker et al. (2013) use similar network
measures in the ﬁnance and accounting literature. However, most of them use one or several speciﬁc measures; only Larcker et al. (2013)
use a comprehensive measure.
108 Y. Chen et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 7 (2014) 101–118
Table 1 deﬁnes all of the variables in our model. Tunnelt is the dependent variable, which is represented by the
fund use measures: TUN, ABNTUN and NMTUN. In robustness tests, we also use DTUN, DABNTUN and
DNMTUN as additional measures. CENt is the explanatory variable. We predict that a1 is negative, that is,
the greater the network centrality of the independent directors, the greater their monitoring eﬀect and the less
prevalent tunneling is by controlling shareholders. We run a Tobit regression for TUN/ABNTUN/NMTUN/
DTUN/DABNTUN/DNMTUN to account for the signiﬁcant number of zero observations.
Similar to those of Jiang et al. (2010), Jian and Wong (2010) and Ye et al. (2007), our control variables
include the ultimate controller’s ownership (SOE), the proportion of the ﬁrm’s equity owned by the largest
shareholder (FSHR), the sum of the ownership stakes of the second to ﬁfth largest shareholders (HFD), sep-
aration of the ownership and control rights of the ultimate controlling shareholder (CO), whether the listed
ﬁrm is part of a group (GROUP), ﬁrm performance (ROE) and the market environment (MKT). Given
the ﬁnding of Zhang et al. (2010) that the largest shareholder’s role changed after the non-tradable share
reform was implemented, we control for this phenomenon (GG). As there was a focus on cleaning up the mis-
use of funds at about the same time as the non-tradable share reform, the GG variable also controls for reg-
ulatory policy. We also control for variables inﬂuencing the governance role of independent directors such as
Table 1
Variable deﬁnitions.
Name Symbol Deﬁnition
Controlling shareholders’
tunneling
TUN Sum of accounts receivable, account prepayments and other receivables held by
controlling shareholders, scaled by total assets
ABNTUN Other receivables held by controlling shareholders, scaled by total assets
NMTUN Sum of accounts receivable and account prepayments held by controlling shareholders,
scaled by total assets; equals (TUN  ABNTUN)
DTUN (accounts receivable + accounts prepayments + other receivables  accounts
payable  receivables in advance  other payables) held by controlling shareholders,
scaled by total assets
DABNTUN Other receivables held by controlling shareholders minus other payables held by the
listed ﬁrm, scaled by total assets
DNMTUN DTUN  DABNTUN
Network centrality of
independent directors
CEN The integrated network centrality of independent directors at the ﬁrm level
(score_median and score _max)
Ultimate controller’s
ownership
SOE An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the ﬁrm is state-owned and 0 otherwise
Concentration of ownership FSHR The ratio of shares held by the largest shareholder divided by the total number of shares
outstanding at the end of the year
Equity restriction HFD The proportion representing the combined ownership stakes of the second to ﬁfth largest
shareholders at the end of the year
Separation of ownership and
control
CO The proportion of control rights and cash ﬂow rights held by the ultimate controller. See
Claessens et al. (2000) for the calculation process
Firm group GROUP An indicator variable that takes the value of 0 if the ﬁrm’s ultimate controller is an
individual, the SASAC, a university, a social organization, a research institution, an
ESOP association or an investment corporation, and 1 otherwise (Li et al., 2004; Tang
et al., 2005)
Performance ROE Net income scaled by equity at the end of the year
Size SIZE The natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the year
Leverage LEV Total liabilities divided by total assets
Market environment MKT A dummy variable equal to 1 if the index of the market environment is above the median
and 0 otherwise. See Fan et al. (2010) for index details
Non-tradable shares reform GG An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the ﬁrm’s non-tradable reform process
is successful and 0 otherwise
Board size BOARD The number of board directors
Duality DUAL An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the board chairman and CEO are the
same person and 0 otherwise
Proportion of independent
directors
OUT The proportion of independent directors on the board in the current year
Industry/year IND/YEAR The industry dummies are based on CSRC benchmarks (2001) and six year dummies
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board size (BOARD), duality (DUAL) and the proportion of independent directors (OUT). We also adopt
other common control variables such as ﬁrm size (SIZE), leverage (LEV) and industry (IND) and year
(YEAR) dummy variables.
4.4. Sample and data
We start with observations for all Chinese A-share listed ﬁrms from 2003 to 2009. Financial industries are
removed from the original dataset. The removal of items with missing data substantially reduces the number
of observations, yielding a ﬁnal sample comprising 9757 ﬁrm-year observations. All of the data are from the
CSMAR database, among which the data on controlling shareholders’ use of funds for related party transac-
tions are from the “cash transfers for related party transactions” CSMAR sub-database. All observations in
the top and bottom 1% for continuous variables are winsorized to control for outliers, and t-values are clus-
tered at the ﬁrm level. The Matlab and Pajek software applications (the most widely recognized software for
analyzing large amounts of social network data) are used to calculate directors’ network centrality.
5. Empirical analysis
5.1. Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis
Table 2 lists the descriptive statistics of all variables. The results show that controlling shareholders’ tun-
neling of operating funds (TUN) has a mean of 2.13% and a maximum of 51.38%. The mean and maximum
for tunneling of non-operating funds (ABNTUN) are 1.15% and 43.47%, respectively. These results imply that
tunneling is a serious problem among controlling shareholders in China. The means of score_median and scor-
e_max are 3.49 and 4.03, respectively. The mean of FSHR is 38% and the median is 36.08%, indicating a need
to improve the monitoring incentives and tunneling suppression capacity of independent directors in Chinese
ﬁrms with highly concentrated ownership. The mean and median of OUT are 35.22% and 33.33%, respec-
tively, implying that the proportion of independent directors in most listed ﬁrms meets or just exceeds the
CSRC requirement.
Table 3 lists the correlations among the main variables.11 There are negative correlations between score_-
median, score_max and all proxies for tunneling by controlling shareholders, especially TUN and ABNTUN.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
Variables Obs. Mean Median Max Min STD
TUN 7572 0.0213 0.0008 0.5138 0.0000 0.0659
ABNTUN 6714 0.0115 0.0000 0.4347 0.0000 0.0517
NMTUN 6714 0.0102 0.0001 0.2077 0.0000 0.0295
score_median 9757 3.4861 3.0000 9.0000 0.0000 2.7506
score_max 9757 4.0323 4.0000 9.0000 0.0000 2.8066
SOE 9757 0.6141 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.4868
FSHR 9757 0.3830 0.3608 0.7584 0.0923 0.1603
HFD 9757 0.0193 0.0073 0.1160 0.0000 0.0259
CO 9757 1.5013 1.0000 6.6051 1.0000 0.9819
GROUP 9757 0.1698 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.3755
ROE 9434 0.0520 0.0694 0.4325 1.2033 0.2019
SIZE 9754 21.3576 21.2416 25.0182 18.7185 1.1797
LEV 9754 0.5303 0.5132 1.9083 0.0728 0.2773
MKT 9757 0.7483 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.4340
GG 8247 0.4422 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.4967
BOARD 9642 9.4105 9.0000 17.0000 5.0000 2.0450
DUAL 9757 0.1444 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.3515
OUT 9639 0.3522 0.3333 0.5000 0.0000 0.0495
11 Due to the length of this paper, the correlation values of the control variables are not reported.
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Neither the Spearman nor the Pearson coeﬃcients of NMTUN, score_median and score_max are signiﬁcant.
Although there are generally negative correlations between the network centrality of independent directors
and tunneling by controlling shareholders, this relationship does not exist when measured by the use of oper-
ating funds. The correlation matrix, however, merely shows the univariate results. Multivariate tests are
needed to obtain more meaningful empirical ﬁndings. The correlations of the non-listed variables are no
higher than 0.5, thus indicating that multicollinearity is not a serious problem in this study.
5.2. Multivariate regression analysis
Table 4 lists the main regression results and shows that when the dependent variable is TUN, the coeﬃcient
on score_median is negative and marginally signiﬁcant (t-value of 1.58) and the coeﬃcient on score_max is
signiﬁcantly negative at the 5% level. When the dependent variable is ABNTUN, the coeﬃcients on both scor-
e_median and score_max are signiﬁcantly negative. However, when the dependent variable is NMTUN, the
coeﬃcients on score_median and score_max are insigniﬁcant. These results imply that controlling sharehold-
ers are more likely to tunnel by using non-operating funds than by appropriating operating funds and that the
eﬀect of independent director network centrality is mainly reﬂected in the use of non-operating funds. Thus,
the empirical results reported above show that the greater the network centrality of independent directors, the
less pervasive tunneling is by controlling shareholders. Our prediction is thus supported, showing that the
board networks of independent directors have the eﬀect of suppressing tunneling by controlling shareholders.
These empirical results demonstrate that studying independent director networks is more meaningful than
merely testing the ratio of independent directors on each board.
Among the control variables, the coeﬃcients on SOE are signiﬁcantly positive at the 1% level, thus indicat-
ing that tunneling is more likely to occur in SOEs, which is similar to the ﬁnding of Gao et al. (2006). The
coeﬃcients on FSHR are signiﬁcantly positive at the 1% level, implying that the larger the ownership stake
of the largest shareholder, the more serious tunneling is likely to be, thus corroborating the ﬁndings of Yu
and Xia (2004) and Li et al. (2004). MKT is signiﬁcantly negatively related to all of the dependent variables,
other than ABNTUN, thus showing that tunneling by controlling shareholders is weaker under better market
environments, a result conﬁrming that of Luo and Tang (2006). GG is signiﬁcantly negatively related to tun-
neling, thus demonstrating that the incentive for tunneling diminished as shares owned by controlling share-
holders became tradable after the non-tradable share reform.
5.3. Robustness tests12
When testing for tunneling by controlling shareholders, the transfer of funds from controlling shareholders
to the listed company must also be considered (Gao et al., 2006; Zeng and Chen, 2009). Therefore, the ﬁrst
Table 3
Correlation matrix.
score_median score_max TUN DTUN ABNTUN DABNTUN NMTUN DNMTUN
score_median 0.828*** 0.006* 0.04*** 0.034*** 0.025** 0.045 0.022*
score_max 0.850*** 0.015** 0.039*** 0.045*** 0.021* 0.044 0.024**
TUN 0.057*** 0.071*** 0.807*** 0.844*** 0.651*** 0.607*** 0.545***
DTUN 0.045*** 0.049*** 0.532*** 0.716*** 0.889*** 0.445*** 0.526***
ABNTUN 0.063*** 0.074*** 0.648*** 0.391*** 0.779*** 0.144*** 0.144***
DABNTUN 0.04*** 0.037*** 0.296*** 0.722*** 0.472*** 0.099*** 0.127***
NMTUN 0.019 0.036*** 0.788*** 0.331*** 0.25*** 0.026** 0.87***
DNMTUN 0.029** 0.044*** 0.461*** 0.603*** 0.132*** 0.108*** 0.532***
Note: Spearman correlations are listed in the upper right of this table and Pearson correlations in the lower left.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
12 Results not reported here can be provided to interested readers.
Y. Chen et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 7 (2014) 101–118 111
robustness test measures the net balance of tunneling by controlling shareholders. Since Gao et al. (2006) ﬁnd
that there are two types of incentives for related party transactions, tunneling and propping, we exclude prop-
ping ﬁrms from our sample. We delete observations with negative values for DTUN, DABNTUN and
DNMTUN and rerun the regressions.13 The results are reported in Table 5, which shows that the network cen-
trality of independent directors is signiﬁcantly negatively related to tunneling by controlling shareholders and
that this holds for both total tunneling (DTUN) and the use of non-operating funds (DABNTUN). Tunneling
by using non-operating funds (DNMTUN) is, however, insigniﬁcantly related to network centrality, reﬂecting
the main results in Table 4. Because controlling shareholders tunnel listed ﬁrms mainly by using company funds
in related party transactions and independent directors have diﬃculty recognizing whether operating transac-
tions constitute tunneling behavior, as do investors (Ye et al., 2007), most of the eﬀect of independent directors
in suppressing tunneling by controlling shareholders is reﬂected in the use of non-operating funds.
Table 4
Multivariate results for independent director network centrality and tunneling.
TUN ABNTUN NMTUN
score_median score_max score_median score_max score_median score_max
CEN 0.0006 0.0008** 0.0009** 0.0010*** 0.0001 0.0001
(1.58) (2.46) (2.55) (3.03) (0.59) (0.49)
SOE 0.0101*** 0.0107*** 0.0069*** 0.0069*** 0.0072*** 0.0072***
(5.21) (5.45) (3.38) (3.40) (5.39) (5.45)
FSHR 0.0536*** 0.0485*** 0.0286*** 0.0285*** 0.0360*** 0.0358***
(9.40) (8.36) (4.79) (4.77) (9.19) (9.16)
HFD 0.0200 0.0123 0.0075 0.0095 0.0292 0.0284
(0.59) (0.36) (0.22) (0.27) (1.28) (1.24)
CO 0.0003 0.0001 0.0007 0.0007 0.0002 0.0001
(0.32) (0.10) (0.62) (0.62) (0.23) (0.21)
GROUP 0.0037* 0.0027 0.0001 0.0001 0.0005 0.0005
(1.84) (1.25) (0.04) (0.03) (0.36) (0.35)
ROE 0.0629*** 0.0645*** 0.0682*** 0.0681*** 0.0117*** 0.0116***
(12.53) (12.69) (13.59) (13.56) (3.41) (3.36)
SIZE 0.0017** 0.0003 0.0014 0.0014 0.0007 0.0008
(2.00) (0.35) (1.49) (1.52) (1.16) (1.29)
LEV 0.0118*** 0.0088* 0.0130*** 0.0130*** 0.0043 0.0044
(2.66) (1.92) (2.78) (2.79) (1.42) (1.43)
MKT 0.0044** 0.0047*** 0.0010 0.0011 0.0049*** 0.0047***
(2.56) (2.72) (0.58) (0.61) (4.20) (4.07)
GG 0.0109*** 0.0064* 0.0047 0.0046 0.0014 0.0014
(5.06) (1.72) (1.18) (1.15) (0.56) (0.57)
BOARD 0.0009** 0.0008* 0.0016*** 0.0016*** 0.0001 0.0002
(2.26) (1.82) (3.79) (3.64) (0.49) (0.66)
DUAL 0.0031 0.0026 0.0019 0.0018 0.0052*** 0.0052***
(1.30) (1.08) (0.77) (0.74) (3.17) (3.19)
OUT 0.0721*** 0.0654*** 0.0584*** 0.0545*** 0.0368*** 0.0363***
(4.12) (3.71) (3.29) (3.06) (3.14) (3.09)
Constant 0.0502*** 0.0172 0.0132 0.0153 0.0328*** 0.0340***
(2.83) (0.93) (0.69) (0.81) (2.65) (2.74)
IND/YEAR
p p p p p p
Pseudo R2 (R2) 0.061 0.079 0.211 0.212 0.058 0.058
LR chi2 (F-Value) 565.9 729.24 790.29 792.94 525.94 525.84
Obs. 6305 6259 5609 5609 5609 5609
Note: t-values are reported in brackets.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
13 The results do not change if these observations are not deleted from the sample.
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We also run a two-stage linear regression to reduce the potential for endogeneity. Adams and Ferreira
(2007) and Armstrong et al. (2010) ﬁnd that the governance role of independent directors depends on the
ﬁrm’s information environment. We therefore choose a number of instrumental variables related to the infor-
mation environment for inclusion in the regression: daily stock volatility over one year (STD), analyst follow-
ing (NUM) and growth (TQ). In the ﬁrst stage, we regress the network centrality of independent directors on
the three instrumental variables, the ownership stake of the largest shareholder, the sum of the square of the
second to ﬁfth largest shareholders’ ownership stakes, SOE, management ownership ratio, ﬁrm size, debt ratio
and industry and year dummy variables. The model is speciﬁed as follows:
CENt ¼ b0 þ b1STDt þ b2NUMt þ b3TQt þ b4FSHRt þ b5HFDt þ b6SOEt þ b7ESHRt þ b8SIZEt
þ b9LEV t þ
X
INDþ
X
YEARþ c ð2Þ
where STD is the standard deviation of daily stock returns during the year; NUM is the analyst following in
year t; TQ = (stock price  outstanding shares + net assets per share  non-trading shares + book value to
Table 5
Results for the net value of tunneling and independent director network centrality.
DTUN DABNTUN DNMTUN
score_median score_max score_median score_max score_median score_max
CEN 0.0010* 0.0014*** 0.0012** 0.0013*** 0.0002 0.0000
(1.86) (2.98) (2.17) (2.58) (0.62) (0.05)
SOE 0.0097*** 0.0098*** 0.0124*** 0.0125*** 0.0053*** 0.0053***
(3.46) (3.50) (4.02) (4.05) (3.29) (3.33)
FSHR 0.0255*** 0.0251*** 0.0022 0.0020 0.0282*** 0.0281***
(3.07) (3.04) (0.25) (0.22) (5.96) (5.93)
HFD 0.0195 0.0232 0.0450 0.0481 0.0065 0.0060
(0.40) (0.48) (0.87) (0.94) (0.23) (0.22)
CO 0.0001 0.0001 0.0007 0.0007 0.0001 0.0001
(0.06) (0.08) (0.45) (0.45) (0.11) (0.12)
GROUP 0.0023 0.0022 0.0029 0.0028 0.0004 0.0004
(0.75) (0.74) (0.91) (0.90) (0.24) (0.24)
ROE 0.0900*** 0.0895*** 0.0919*** 0.0916*** 0.0155*** 0.0154***
(12.54) (12.48) (12.51) (12.48) (3.76) (3.73)
SIZE 0.0015 0.0013 0.0003 0.0003 0.0013* 0.0012*
(1.14) (1.02) (0.22) (0.20) (1.73) (1.65)
LEV 0.0104 0.0105 0.0042 0.0042 0.0074** 0.0074**
(1.57) (1.59) (0.59) (0.60) (1.99) (2.00)
MKT 0.0048* 0.0045* 0.0023 0.0024 0.0039*** 0.0038***
(1.93) (1.84) (0.85) (0.89) (2.79) (2.70)
GG 0.0081 0.0080 0.0119* 0.0118* 0.0014 0.0015
(1.48) (1.47) (1.88) (1.86) (0.48) (0.49)
BOARD 0.0016*** 0.0015** 0.0022*** 0.0021*** 0.0001 0.0000
(2.65) (2.40) (3.48) (3.34) (0.23) (0.13)
DUAL 0.0019 0.0020 0.0016 0.0015 0.0047** 0.0048**
(0.56) (0.57) (0.45) (0.42) (2.40) (2.41)
OUT 0.0837*** 0.0778*** 0.0738*** 0.0686*** 0.0394*** 0.0394***
(3.35) (3.11) (2.83) (2.62) (2.79) (2.78)
Constant 0.0561** 0.0515* 0.0281 0.0253 0.0102 0.0094
(2.09) (1.91) (0.96) (0.87) (0.67) (0.62)
IND/YEAR
p p p p p p
Pseudo R2 0.429 0.433 0.187 0.187 0.064 0.065
LR chi2 675.91 681.29 840.52 842.45 281.48 281.1
Obs. 6259 6259 5609 5609 5609 5609
Note: t-values are reported in brackets.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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liabilities)/total assets at the end of the year (if all shares are tradable, TQ = (total market value of equity + -
book value of total liabilities)/total assets at the end of the year). The predicted value of the network centrality
of independent directors from the ﬁrst-stage regression is then added to the second regression model as
follows:
TUNNELt ¼ a0 þ a1PCENt þ
X
Controlsþ
X
INDþ
X
YEAR þ k ð3Þ
As shown in Table 6, the results based on this two-stage regression are consistent with those of the main
tests, regardless of whether score_median or score_max is used.
We also follow Xiao et al. (2009) and Chen et al. (2010) by running a proxy variable two-stage regression.14
In the ﬁrst stage, we regress the network centrality of independent directors on director size, duality, indepen-
dence of directors, and the ownership stake of the largest shareholder, the square of the sum of the ownership
Table 6
Two-stage instrumental variable regression results.
TUN ABNTUN NMTUN
score_median score_max score_median score_max score_median score_max
PCEN 0.0050* 0.0045* 0.0075* 0.0039* 0.0037 0.0029
(1.84) (1.87) (1.85) (1.67) (1.61) (1.59)
SOE 0.0060*** 0.0061*** 0.0050** 0.0047** 0.0051*** 0.0051***
(2.80) (2.84) (2.41) (2.28) (4.09) (4.14)
FSHR 0.0291*** 0.0291*** 0.0023 0.0044 0.0292*** 0.0286***
(4.61) (4.60) (0.38) (0.72) (8.04) (7.94)
HFD 0.0623 0.0623 0.0508 0.0354 0.0348 0.0332
(1.61) (1.60) (1.36) (0.96) (1.57) (1.51)
CO 0.0002 0.0003 0.0005 0.0008 0.0007 0.0006
(0.22) (0.25) (0.45) (0.72) (1.10) (0.96)
GROUP 0.0007 0.0007 0.0034 0.0028 0.0010 0.0002
(0.30) (0.27) (1.45) (1.20) (0.72) (0.11)
ROE 0.0992*** 0.0990*** 0.0923*** 0.0921*** 0.0129*** 0.0125***
(16.83) (16.76) (16.58) (16.62) (3.84) (3.73)
SIZE 0.0020* 0.0020* 0.0009 0.0003 0.0012* 0.0011*
(1.90) (1.81) (0.75) (0.33) (1.73) (1.71)
LEV 0.0276*** 0.0278*** 0.0294*** 0.0288*** 0.0036 0.0038
(5.39) (5.41) (5.87) (5.84) (1.22) (1.30)
MKT 0.0013 0.0014 0.0057*** 0.0061*** 0.0040*** 0.0040***
(0.68) (0.71) (2.94) (3.18) (3.56) (3.52)
GG 0.0069 0.0068 0.0087** 0.0091** 0.0012 0.0001
(1.61) (1.59) (2.07) (2.17) (0.51) (0.08)
BOARD 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0015*** 0.0015*** 0.0002 0.0002
(2.82) (2.69) (3.31) (3.22) (0.58) (0.60)
DUAL 0.0031 0.0032 0.0012 0.0013 0.0057*** 0.0058***
(1.17) (1.23) (0.45) (0.52) (3.77) (3.82)
OUT 0.0957*** 0.0966*** 0.0680*** 0.0695*** 0.0277** 0.0248**
(4.84) (4.88) (3.59) (3.67) (2.48) (2.23)
Constant 0.1152*** 0.1105*** 0.0683*** 0.0497** 0.0179 0.0197*
(5.48) (5.32) (3.24) (2.48) (1.45) (1.66)
IND/YEAR
p p p p p p
Pseudo R2 (R2) 0.061 0.062 0.107 0.103 0.047 0.046
LR chi2 (F-Value) 749.71 755.87 839.15 809.4 647.16 637.49
Obs. 7375 7375 6904 6904 6904 6904
Note: t-values are reported in brackets.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
14 This proxy variable approach provides useful information from the residual values of the model with which to run the second-stage
regression, but no regression is run on the explanatory variables. This approach can be used to ﬁnd the instrumental variables more easily.
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stakes of the second to ﬁfth largest shareholders, SOE, ﬁrm size, debt ratio, and return on total assets in the
previous year. The residuals of the ﬁrst-stage regression are then added to the second stage model. Unreported
results show that the CEN_residual is negatively related to TUN at the 5% or 10% level of signiﬁcance.
In a third robustness test of the main results, we use the two integrated measures of score_median and scor-
e_max to proxy for the network centrality of independent directors. Our results also hold when using the mean
and minimum values of ﬁrm-level centrality. The results show that the coeﬃcients for two of the three mea-
sures of centrality are signiﬁcant, the exception being that for the eigenvector centrality of the network. Rank
index values of network centrality also provide similar results. In summary, all of our robustness tests support
our hypothesis.
Moreover, because Jiang and Yue (2005) and Jiang et al. (2010) ﬁnd that all “other receivables” can be used
for tunneling, we also use this measure. In untabulated analysis, our main results hold when using “other
receivables” as the proxy for controlling shareholders’ tunneling behavior.
6. Conclusions
In China, the motivation for establishing a system of independent directors was to constrain the tunneling
behavior of controlling shareholders and protect the interests of minority investors. However, because the
appointment of independent directors is controlled by controlling shareholders themselves, the expectation
that the monitoring ability of independent directors would be enhanced by increasing their number and pro-
portion has undoubtedly proven futile. Moreover, given their concern with social status and reputation, not all
independent directors are willing to serve as whistleblowers. Hence, more attention should be paid to the moti-
vations and abilities enabling prospective independent directors to monitor controlling shareholders. Few
prior studies focus in detail on the relationship between social networks and corporate governance. This paper
adopts a social networking perspective to investigate the governance role of independent directors in China.
Speciﬁcally, using various indicators of the use of company funds by controlling shareholders, we examine the
relationship between the network centrality of independent directors and controlling shareholders’ appropri-
ation of ﬁrm funds. Empirical evidence shows that tunneling behavior is negatively related to network central-
ity, especially when non-operating cash is used as the measure of tunneling. All of our results imply that
independent directors can reduce tunneling by large shareholders through their board network and play a
positive and meaningful role in corporate governance.
Although we deﬁne networks as direct connections among directors sitting on at least one common board,
we also recognize that other networks of independent directors that are unrelated to their board activities,
such as school ties, will also have an eﬀect on their governance role. We look forward to collecting data rel-
evant to such networks for further study.
Appendix A. Measurement of board network centrality
We follow Freeman (1979), Wasserman and Faust (1994) and Xie and Chen (2012) by using network cen-
trality analysis, which is part of social network analysis, to represent independent directors’ positions in the
board network of all listed ﬁrms. The basic measures are degree centrality, betweenness centrality, closeness
centrality and eigenvector centrality, which together characterize the diﬀerent elements of network centrality.
The speciﬁc calculation methods are as follows:
(1) Degree centrality: Degreei ¼
P
j
X ji
g1
This measure represents the number of direct ties a director has in a board network, which characterizes the
director’s participation in the network. Where imeasures a director, jmeasures all directors other than i in one
year; Xji is a network relation indicator that takes the value of 1 if director i and director j are on the same
board and 0 otherwise; g is the number of directors in the board network in one year. As the scope of the
board network diﬀers between years, (g  1) is used to eliminate the scale diﬀerence.
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(2) Betweenness centrality: Betweennessi ¼
P
j<k
gjkðniÞ=gjk
ðg1Þðg2Þ
This measure represents the degree to which one director controls communication among others and reﬂects
the degree to which the same director reduces the path distance between all pairs of other directors. It is a
measure of the extent to which the director acts as a “bridge” in helping others to form connections. Where
gjkðniÞ is the number of geodesics in which director j communicates with director k.
P
j<kgjkðniÞ=gjk means the
geodesics of all pairs of other directors including director i. We use (g  1)(g  2)/2 to eliminate diﬀerences
in board size (Freeman, 1979).
(3) Closeness centrality: Closenessi ¼
Pg
j¼1dði;jÞ
g1
 1
This measure is deﬁned as the reciprocal value of the sum of distances travelled when director i communicates
with all other directors and indicates how quickly and independently one director can relate to others. Where
d(i, j)is the distance between director i and director j. If one director does not connect with all other directors,
then this method cannot be used to accurately calculate the degree of centrality. Therefore, similar to Liu
(2010), we divide the number of directors to whom he can relate directly in the network, then multiply the
result by the proportion it bears to the total number of directors in the board network.
(4) Eigenvector centrality: Eigenvectori ¼ 1k
P
jbijEj
This measure is the weighted value of a director’s direct connections and indicates the extent to which a direc-
tor’s network centrality is related to that of his neighbors (Bonacich, 1972). The weights represent the impor-
tance of the directors to whom he connects. Eigenvector centrality can be calculated by the standard
“eigenvalue–eigenvector” model: BE = kE, where bij is an adjacency matrix that takes the value of 1 if director
i and director j are on the same board and 0 otherwise. k is the largest eigenvalue and Ej is the eigenvalue of
director j’s centrality. In the social network ﬁeld, actors who receive more information are valuable sources of
information. This measure of centrality is aimed at ﬁnding the most central actor, but does not focus on the
fractional structure (Bonacich, 1972).
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